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Martin Jacques you'll never see the world the same way again
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'If you go to china you'll never see the world the same way again'
Martin Jacques | Middle East Eye 2026年5月1日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0wKS7flwzw&t=6834s
it was a very interesting um uh Chinese philosopher Jiao Tinyong who argued in
an article in 2005 that um China uh
China has essentially a world view in a way that the west does not have a
worldview. China believes in a concept of the
world. The west doesn't really. The west believes in a concept of nation states
as you can see the United Nations. I mean the nearest we get to a a world thing is the United Nations but it's based on nation states. So the Chinese
view, the Chinese philosophical view uh was is that um uh uh
it is that China's relationship with the world um should you know should be
genuinely global and and this is reinforced greatly by the experience of
colonization and China's identification with the colonial countries which is
clear very very clear after 1949 you know 1955 and the Bandong conference
and so on um this was this was this was
central to China's thinking and um Mao uh was very committed to its China's
relationship with Africa he identified with Africa of course at that stage China was poorer than quite a number of
African states after the end of the second world war so um So I think that
um uh we have to seed belt and road in
these other there's various traditions and historical experiences and
philosophical conceptions which flow into this notion of belt and road and
lie behind it because it's not a natural thing. It's not there's nothing there's no model for it other than perhaps I
bits of Chinese history but out elsewhere there aren't any things like it. So this I think this was this was
this was the thinking behind it. Um now um I and that's that obviously that
notion has developed a lot uh with um the global south now as we tend to call
it um the developing world um and China
China's foreign relations are first and foremost based on its relationship with the global south. It doesn't think of uh
it it beyond the point it doesn't trust the west. I can see why. Um the west doesn't
doesn't trust China. No, but I mean what do you think about specifically that criticism? For example, they'll build a bunch of ports in in Sri Lanka or
they'll build a bunch of ports on on in various African countries on the east coast or even the western coast. And
then there's a criticism that you know obviously they put down the investment. They usually bring in Chinese workers to
an extent to help with that. But then the criticism is now that country is indebted to it and so China has leverage
over them and can impact their policies their you know whatever it may be. Um
what do you I mean which is which is is there some truth in that? Yeah, I think there is a there is some truth in that. But I think that part of it was
inevitable in the sense that you know you want to establish this or that infrastructure project or railway
whatever it is in in a country and you you know and so obviously a Chinese
company does it because how else are you going to do it and and then you haven't got a labor force that is skil has the
necessary skills and so on. So uh you and then the Chinese company feels more
comfortable with Chinese workers because they'll follow the the disciplines and so on. So I don't I don't think one's
it's I think one can understand the reasons for it without
um saying well this is a neoc colonial project. Um
uh and I think that if you look at what's happened I mean you know so many
countries have signed up to Belton Road so many countries um with big projects I
mean so this is a big thing now below is actually a microcosm
of uh the way the world is moving in terms of a global order
because the new global order in My view that will replace
the present global order is going the axis of that is going to be China and
the global south. That's that's going to be this this is also in my view a great
possibility because historically in the British you know the British Empire and the American Empire sort of thing these
were tiny minorities running the world but if there's a if there is a genuine
possibility which I think there is of a global order based in the first instance on China and the global south that's 85%
of the world's reation. So, one can imagine a major, you know, the first
majoritarian global order. I'm not going to say that it' be perfect. I'm not going to say there's nothing wrong with
it, but historically speaking, it would be a great advance on what's happened in the past. Okay. I want to I want to discuss the
future more. I want to discuss Donald Trump and I want to discuss potentially India, which has a you know, fractious
relationship with China at best. But before that, I mean, when I I agree with a lot of what you've said, and I think a
lot of people listening to would agree with a lot of a lot of what you've said, would understand that. I think increasingly China gets soft love from
people in the sense that they may still, you know, decry China or worry about it, but they kind of like admire it. They
admire its advancement. They admire the fact that it has all these interesting EVs which cost a third of what Western
car cost and are just as good. I mean in terms of their features at least we don't yet know about how their engines
perform in 10 years because they've only been on our streets for three or four years but I mean when it comes to the
issue of human rights right now the west has lost a lot of credibility um honestly over 400 years on human rights
but specifically I think it's been very visible in the last two or three years right but I mean it's not a new thing if you go back to the war in Iraq if you go
back to Vietnam if you go back to the war war on on Korea like it's I mean western you know I mean you people were
struggling in the 60s and 70s and 80s, you know, for for for racial equality and there's still lots of racism in the
West. So, I mean, there's lots of issues. Um, but besides those issues, they've it seems like there are valid
concerns about scapegoating China for a lot of other things, right? Um, locking
up this denters. I mean what what's there there's lots of reports from very credible organizations organizations that I' I've relied on as a journalist
and see as credible human rights watch amnesty about the awful uh you know internment of weaguers in in Jing Jang.
I mean in my reporting career I've met I've met people who are weaguer who have told me horrifying stories about their
relatives going missing. Um the fact that they are overseas themselves and that they are there already is jeopardy
for their family who you know they can't contact anymore. So, it it's a weird thing because even I'm I'm sitting here
listening to you and I I want to be like I want to be a fan of China, right?
But then I'm like, but there's all these horrible things going on. How do I put the two together?
Xinjiang and the Uyghurs
Well, um uh you really the the question you've
raised particularly is Shing Jang. I mean, it's that Yeah, mainly. Yes. Uh uh I mean I I
think that um generally it's a kind of China is a a
pretty we're very lawabiding but lawful society as well. You know it's not that
people are locked up on the on the basis of nothing and so on. It's a very sophisticated society now in China and
and when people are talking about it they you know it feels like they're talking about the cultural revolution or
some period like that when when there were a lot of arbitrary arrests and and
so on. Now uh I think it's it's much it's a
much more lawful society now as it's developed and as it's become more and more educated and so on. Um, and as it's
become more aware of it, the importance of its own reputation internationally, I think that's another factor that's uh
been uh um uh uh shaping the way China
uh uh reacts and deals with things. Um so I I I think that because the question
of human rights is used in a very wide way. I mean I'll come to Shing Jang
because it's important but uh you know do you know what are the what are the
rights of people in China compared with the rights of people in the west education they've got excellent
education system in many ways probably better than here for everyone or the vast majority
attitude towards poverty um they've taken um actually 800 million people out
of poverty um since 1978. Um including uh and they must be the
only country in the world that you know in to get rid of extreme poverty in that campaign in a few years ago u which
required extraordinary amounts of investment to try and take people out of poverty. So um in in the rural areas
they're still poor of course but they're not as poor as they were. Um uh that's a
Can you imagine that happening in the United States or or here? I don't think
so. I mean actually what's happened is that um in the period of you know the last 30
40 years um actually um inequalities have worsened um and uh there have been
no really major positive steps to try and intervene in that process and help those who are uh the least the least
fortunate. you know geographical areas have fallen behind etc. human expectation of life in Glasgow compared
with London 10 years difference you know so so I think that's a very important
aspect of human rights which the Chinese have been very uh very proactive about
now um what now when when it comes to politics yeah look the
definitely the lines of what's acceptable are drawn on much more
narrowly than here in a way that we British people would not I think tolerate or would not like um uh and uh
under she it's probably got worse uh although I personally you know I come to
opinion actually she I didn't have this so strongly but but she's been a
remarkable leader for China actually um but um but as early on you know that
just it would definitely became more restrictive in terms of what people
could say and write and get kept published and so on. Having said that, of course, you know, the internet has
opened up, you know, like someone like Waybo, which is their that, you know, their sort of version of Twitter. Um,
you know, it's very very um argumentative. And
what what can I say on Waybo? What what couldn't I say? For example, I mean, I've never been on Waybo. most of our
listeners or people watching this would never have been on WEO. So to give us a sense of just how restrictive or or
non-restrictive it is what what I guessing I can't say anything about she but can I can I you know and I can't say
anything probably in defense of Shing Jang or Tibet or but what what can I say
and what can't I say? Uh I I I think that on I I I don't remember now what about
apologies but about Shinj Shing Jang and what what was what was on waybo and what wasn't so I can only talk in in more
general terms really which is that I think that um u uh there's a lot of
controversies in China a lot of arguments about um um about the internet
about social media media about um about
uh what's another good example? I mean um
the the big social issues. I mean that they there is a very very you know it's
a it's a sophisticated so society with a lot of educated sophisticated people
who've got ideas and thoughts and so the idea that that they can't say anything
about anything particularly that that is complete nonsense. Uh I think that's
it's just wrong. Um but you know if you wanted to argue see it's a society which
if you say if what you know can you argue for the creation of another
political party or something like that. Um I I doubt it but I don't really know the answer to that to be honest with you
is what where the limits would be drawn. I mean my own experience was of way I
because I uh contribute to waybo or used to I'm not doing at the moment particularly but um the only time I got
there I had one piece not not was taken down or I can't remember what it was
about but I remember another piece where it got changed because you're not
allowed to mention the Xiinping's name. You can say the leader or there's
various ways but you're not allowed to say even if it's praise. Yeah. No. Okay. Talk at all because it
was my the way I referred to it was not part was not negative but yeah but it
was just like sensibilities you know it's about you know China's got its own
notions of you know honor and uh you
know what's what's the word? Yeah. uh codes about what you can say just like
we have and uh um so I I I I mean I it definitely um the
universities have become more restricted during this last in what way like how give me an example.
Um well I think the range of lecturers at universities uh who you invited to
speak it's become more controlled. Um I I don't agree with that. I think that's
uh negative definitely. Um uh and so the the
one of the problems that happened was that in the last years of the Huintow
era which was um 2002 to 2012.
Um it became there was a lot of corruption and the corruption was
growing and it was uh particularly you expect you know within the public sector
with sub civil servants uh and uh uh the party communist party um and uh and
people were losing some faith I think u
in they they resented the fact that people were getting on because they and getting rich or getting promoted be and
enjoying the um uh the benefits of corruption and so on. So when she came
in one of his first big things maybe the first big thing was an attack
on corruption and it was it it was very very straight.
So um you know now people in public office you know there were very strict
limits on how much they could earn what else they could do uh whether they could
set accept gifts all those kind of things. So it became very sort of puritanical if you like compared with
what it's been. Um but the problem was that actually um uh this is a very
important thing which didn't get put reported nearly enough here but this was a very important political struggle over
you know the standards and the values and so on that should be should should
uh that governance uh had to uh embrace and uh uh and there was a strong view
that it was kind of corroding society and corroding I I I think there was no question that this was true this was
happening Um and so so the so there there was a big um uh uh
new much more many more controls were instituted to to stop this and in the
process I think it went it went into areas where it shouldn't have gone into you know but
I mean I think this is a much more complicated question the way we normally discuss it. I mean, China's incredibly
innovative, incredibly inventive. And you know, people now remember the the
old western line used to be um well, China will can never become
a moderniz, you know, a leading modernized economy. Um because it was a
communist state and didn't allow discussion and didn't allow debate. And what's happened is that, you know, it
has become that. And there is clearly, you know, there there is a lot of discussion and debate in China, but it's
just different. I think if you were British and you were living in China and you spoke Chinese and so on, you'd find
it difficult uh to adapt to that, but not impossible because you'd start, you know, you'd see the logic of it and and
and become to, you know, um if
ultimately I suppose respect it, but uh or or or become anyway, I'm blathering
along now. So, yeah. Okay. But I mean coming back to to Jing Jang which you said you you'll get to. Yeah. Yeah. Sorry. Uh well
I I find it very hard to get to to the bottom of the Shinjang. I I've been to
Shinjang once just once to um and um I think that the trouble with
uh the situation in uh well I think that the Chinese made
some serious mistakes. one was to allow far too much Han immigration
into Shing Jang um with the result it's it's much higher
than for example what happened in Tibet Tibet still low hand hand population as
as a proportion but was was that intentional I mean the allowing of I I think what h what happens is that
well I think some of it's intentional Chinese firms recruit hand
um And some of it is unintentional in that. Yes. You know, h like like seeking
opportunity. Yeah. Exactly. Like any migration, you know, even internal migration in Britain when you you know, I'm going to leave
the northeast cuz I want opportunities. I'll go down there. And I think that what happened
definitely and the chi the Chinese are very very entrepreneurial. I mean I I said earlier the very hard way. They're
very entrepreneurial. They you know they're very good at it. They're really they're absolutely natural at it. It's
obviously absolutely centuries of of uh No, no. I I mean just in so they so that's they go so then then
they become wealthy because because the we go were basically
in the poorer areas near the O8s and so on but but it were
essentially well they until a generation or two ago were partly nomadic so they
came from you know a much and they didn't have the networks with the rest
of China that the Han would have in Shing Jang. So there was a there was a
growing sense of resent resentment amongst the weager towards the Han too
many. Okay. But how does that then results in internment camps and suppression of their identity and people being
well I think I think that it led to um it this the situation led to
friction. I mean we have to go back a bit here. We have to go back to was it 2009
when um there was there was
a pilgrim by Wea in Arumchi
resulting quite a few hand deaths and immediately afterwards
the hand there was a big hand demonstrated. So you have a bit of a
powder cake here uh between the two. Um
and uh so now to to deal and and you had the
development of of of um um
more anti- well I don't know what terms to use for this but um you had more
hostility uh towards the Han and towards Chinese things amongst the weager population and
so this was supp repressed I mean when I went to uh um uh Rumchi. Uh it was on
the face of it everything was quite calm and so on. This was 2015 2015 I think it was. Um and um and then uh and there was
nothing particularly odd and in the hotel where I was staying um they had um
you know um scanners but no one was operating the scanners. So it felt like
quite laidback. But if you went a certain to another area, then you'd
suddenly see, you know, a police van, which was a kind of militarized police
van and a whole load of police obviously to deal with what
there's obviously a problem of terrorism in in in I tell you what it reminded me
reminded me a bit of the troubles in Northern Ireland. That's the new but I mean but I mean I think terrorism
is a bit of a scapegoat like I mean I'm not trying to say that there are never acts of of violence by the wigers but
it's I mean I haven't been to Jinga but what you just I have been to Kashmir and what you what you're saying just it it
sounds a lot like Kashmir where where there is where where obviously there's there's acts of of of of of violence
because Kashmiris are upset that they are being marginalized that they are being suppressed but the solution to that isn't you know
stricter checkpoints and more militarization and you know I mean the the the police
presence there incites a reaction it incites violence it incites and is a
form of of of of you know uprooting it not necessar I mean in Kashmir it's seen
by the locals it's occupation in Jing Jang probably it's not occupation but it's it's seen as as a sorts of control
of who they are and how and it's just I mean it's not it's definitely not the way you manage
the problem yeah I agree do that. I agree. I think you're right. At the end of the day, you can't solve a problem like that by
repression. Yes. You have to uh uh listen to what the the
agrievces are. But I mean, I don't think the ch the thing is so I I think it's clear that there isn't a lot of that happening.
There isn't a lot of dialogue. There's a lot more suppression or control, right, occurring. Well, I think that the situation has
gone through different phases. So the phase there was a a phase after the the
the pograms and so on um where I think they uh they tried to
um I can't remember the historical phase now but they tried to um uh there was a
phase of repression and then from about 2012 to 200 I don't know 2010 10 I can't
remember 2010 to 2014 something like that. There was a more liberal regime
introduced. Um and uh the vi the violence and so on got
worse. Um and so they then about 2015 16 they
put another guy in running the show. This is in the the key job is a party job not the state job. And the party job
is always Han, never weager.
The head of the government might be weager, but the real power lies with the party in that situation. And they uh and
and and then there was they obvious the the guy that they came in was had a very
repressive view. And I think that's when you got this new um
um Yeah. But obviously the guy who came in was backed by Beijing. Oh yeah. No, he's appointed by Beijing.
I mean, absolutely. It's very important. I mean I mean the Chinese are nervous about this. I mean I remember I I was at
a conference with lots of international people. Um and I was one of the ones who
could ask a question. It was with the who the guy speaking was the then the
vice president. And um I asked a my question was could was about uh Shing
Jang and uh I asked uh uh you know could
you give a a report you know I asked a succinct question and the only question
that never was never replied to was my question. They they just didn't want to
talk about it. Um and and I think that uh
I think I think I I think it's a very big problem for them which
Do do you think they see it as a big problem? You know I I've when I'm having Yes, I do. I think they have because
because one of the things that really strikes me over the last several years is huge amounts of money they've been
putting putting into Shing Jang. Um I mean it's the fastest growing province and has been for some time now. But I
mean the thing is how are they planning to deal with the situation? Are they hoping it goes away? Are they hoping? No, I like what's there I mean what I
don't understand from the state is it seems like this is a very efficient state. Fair enough. They have a
different culture in terms of of freedom of speech, right? Very different very different culture in terms of leadership. I can get all of that stuff.
But the Jing Jang thing and I mean it's other things too but I mean I think the Jing Jang let's just focus on that because it's it's it's like sort of the
the key case study that that exemplifies all of these issues. It's like as a very
smart efficient nation and government. You surely see a more intelligent way to
deal with this problem than repression and you don't seem to be letting up. And
this is it's a publicity problem. It's an efficiency problem. It's an immoral thing. So like I I don't understand it.
Why are they pursuing this policy? I think that Yeah. Well, it's a good query very very good question fair
question. Um I think that
I suppose we need to stand back and ask a question about ethnic diversity in
China. And um
China's I mean China's China is obviously China is is the product of
many many different races over time and and yet
today um something like
93 94% of the population would describe themselves as Han.
Han actually is not a c I mean Han is not actually a racial category but that's how it's that's how it evolved in
the 19th century and um so so there is
there is and you can see if you go to China there's a lot of ethnic diversity um
but uh by and and they recognize ethnic diversity because you know that was part
of what they did after 1949 you know there was 54 54 ethnic groups and this
whereas previously under Chiang Kai-shek before that there there was no ethnic diversity or no recognition of it. So
that was that was an advance. Um I think that uh that what's happened
historically with the development of China is that that ethnic diversity has
weakened u with the process of you know there has been a kind of process of hannization if
you like. So state a state a state process a state project. Well, I whether it's a state,
yeah, there's an element of the state's involved in it, but also it's as a popular level. I think that what
happened take take the Manchu, you know, the the um theQing dynasty,
two of the last three dynasties in China were non-han.
One was the uh the manu manurians in from the northeast and there that that
dynasty lasted from the mid7th century till 1911.
Then there was the Ming dynasty which was before that which was a Han dynasty
and lasted about two or 30 hund years. And then before that for 100 years you got the Yuan dynasty which was Mongolian
and which was very different in lots of ways and was part of um drawn from the
steps and so on. Um so there's a so it
it's it's we somehow one has to try and understand
uh uh China's attitude towards ethnicity and how it operates and how it works in
the context of this kind of historical tradition. So it's I mean if you take
it's not just a it's not a Muslim problem particularly because there are The weer are the second biggest Muslim
group in China. The biggest are the Hawaii and they are very integrated and
but they come from historically different geographical reasons from what regions from where the uh the weaguer
came from. So they're very integrated and very successful by and large. Um
but the weager have not been successful and I think that
I mean also the the Chinese mentality is very much an urban mentality you know
and cities they live in cities they go to cities you see see including migr in my terms of global migration so I think
that um uh uh that there's an element of prejudice involved in that. There's
obviously a multi-layered sources of prejudice amongst the hands uh in in
Shing Jang for example and they they they look down on uh the weager
and so and the weaguer resent that quite rightly quite quite understandably. Um
so I'm trying to build up a more of a picture. I think that that was a colossal wrong move to that to to
whatever they were doing in those I mean it's been they've been described as kind of semi- prisons. I don't I don't buy
that. But I mean I I would I think over I mean I don't know but I think that I mean I I don't not buy that some of the
conditions in some of those camps at times are really really bad and and then there's a there's not just the camps
there's the infrastructure around the camps fact that people are taken no one knows where they are. There's the the
the atmosphere of you can't speak. There's the atmosphere of
you have We haven't had that kind of coverage recently, have we? Not. No. I mean, but I mean I don't think it
just disappears. I don't think I don't think though I don't think systems of power that oppress you just go away overnight. No, no, no. That that that was an
extreme form. Yes. Yes. Um, no, but I mean there's still I mean there still many people many many weagers who are living in
London or in other parts of the west who still don't aren't in contact with their family, don't know where they are. So I mean
it's ongoing. It's not that there's an ongoing problem. Yeah. The it it's been going on since
the 1930s. I mean it goes back a long time. the the particular problem I think
um uh for the Chinese is you know you and your point you alluded to earlier
was this notion of unity of the country and the problem we the weaguers a
section of the weagers think they should be independent from China no I I I do think I think I think
that is that is a problem there's this Han monoculture it's like a there's a move to kind of have a
monoculture of sorts in China which I feeds into it. Um, which I think is both a state project and I could be wrong, so
speak to please correct me. But also I think it's it's aspirational for the people. So many people who are possibly
more ethnically diverse than Han now want to be associated with Han because it's it's being associated with the
China that's on the rise. this new rising dynasty sort of you take if you take um uh Manuria I
mean the decline of um of um people who speaking Manchu you know it it's
obviously partly because they want to be associated with this new urban society
you know yes exactly I mean it's something happening in India now where where people are excited about the the state's
prosperity and so they're adopting Hindu nationalism as part of their identity not because they necessarily love Hindu
nationalism but because they see it as a conduit of of India's new success. Um okay so now the probably the crux of
I mean the main part of why we're having this conversation which is which is the future and you know US decline uh seems
Trump and US decline
to be occurring. I think that's a that's it's a relative to every other I mean
some would say no some would say the USA is still really amazing. It's got the seven biggest companies in the world.
Um, strongest military in the world. Um, you know, Donald Trump is uh is, you
know, a manifestation of that greatness because he just goes and kidnaps presidences and and other people will
see the complete opposite. They'll say that, you know, the economy is in decline. Its relative strength to the world is in decline. Its relative
military strength to the world is in decline. Um, you obviously I'm assuming take the view that the US is in
massively in decline and China has already eclipsed it or about to eclipse it in many ways.
How is the world going to change in the next 20 30 years based on on you know the the rise of China and the decline of
the US and and where do you see US power sort of working itself out US China
power working itself out in the future? Well, I think that um talking about uh
where things are now, I mean there's no question looking at the
statistics and so on um that relatively speaking, China's been on the rise and
the United States has been in decline and uh the significance of Trump and the
rise of Trump um was that he gave voice
to that unease in American society. uh the conditions of many working-class
Americans had been declining or or over quite a long time or or stagnating. Um
and uh people were increasingly uh frustrated by and let down by um the
American presidencies. Um so what
Trump Trump was uh uh articulated
uh the the anger towards and fear of China
uh which had not really been articulated except in traditional ways in in the US
at that point. Um and uh and he's really in so doing he's I think
recreated or redefined the American political stage in a very profound way.
Um he uh I mean it he he's
America so a number of points we might draw from that. First of all, America America
democracy is under significant challenge. I think um uh the role of I
mean he's uh Trump himself is a sort of neo watercrat if you like the way he
operates. Um I mean he's ruled essentially by edict and completely bypass Congress.
Um so America is changing in a very you know the way in which uh the government
sent in ICE people uh to uh essentially
attack migrant communities or weaken them or banish them from the country.
Um so America's and and and meanwhile America has
uh in a way with the whole tariff regime recognized the weakness of the American
economy as a competitive unit in the world and introduced tariffs as a means
to try and readjust that situation. I think that uh Trump um
marks globally a retreat in that he he talks about the western hemisphere.
Well, there are two two two elements to this if you're right. He talks about the western hemisphere. He doesn't he it you
know we greater America is greater America within the context of the western hemisphere.
uh Greenland for example is talked about in in that context.
Uh now that's a big that's a significant retreat from China from the United
States as the global hegimon because previously the question was you
know international order United States as the leader of the international order and so on. Now Trump is talking in he
hemispheric terms rather than global terms. Um I think the other uh element
of this is his attitude towards China. Now for for Trump the real enemy is China
but but he has been unable I mean he in the
clashes he's had with China each stage he's been forced to retreat in April and
then more recently and the reason is when he rare metals threat and so on. Um
so China's too strong now for America. So Trump can't would like to do but
can't do what what I you know he'd like to roll back China in some way and that's how it all started. I mean I
think when he came in in uh 2016 that's what he thought he could do and they
can't do it and they won't be able to do it because the situation you know the situation's getting worse all the time.
Worse with the Americans worse with with the Americans. Yeah. Sorry. And um uh and China's getting
stronger. I mean and China just has China thinks strategically.
Um so after the first exp I think they the Chinese learned a lot from the first
term. The first term um they weren't really prepared for it. They'd never
seen anyone like Trump before. They'd had the American leaders they're dealing with ever since Nixon uh in 1972 had
been relatively, you know, they've been part of a certain liberal America which
we're familiar with. Um and then along comes Trump who's a totally different
kettle of fish, you know, someone we haven't seen in modern times from as American leader. And um and the Chinese
were the Chinese were because they had cooperated America ever since 1972. They
they had a relatively benign view. I mean they knew it was competition and all that but they were they didn't think
of America as the enemy and they were grateful they learned from America blah blah blah you know all the technology
and so on. And now I think what hap well what happened as they learned that this
is this is that they had that they that America could not be trusted.
Now in the communist party leadership ever since
uh um Jang Zamid
um there had been a view that that that China just had a certain period
of development like they were having before America
tries to put stop it. Yeah. Exactly. And that's of course what happened. But they when it actually
happened, I don't think they were really prepared for it. But they realized now exactly that that
America could couldn't be trusted. And they prepared uh meticulously
for the return of someone like Trump. Actually, it was Trump 2.0. And uh if
you look at I mean one of the most interesting and and and and graphic examples is the Chinese just great
greatly reduced their dependence on the American market. I mean between between 206
um and uh and 2024 um the Chinese reduced the significance
of Chinese exports to the Chinese American market from I think it was 19
20% down to 13%. That's a big reduction in a very short space of time. So they
were just they they you know a self emphasis on self-dependence and so on and then you know if you look now you
know they were in in difficulties in the Biden period over chips and so on because of China was sign well well
behind America at that point America and Netherlands and and Taiwan and um and so
you know the Chinese knew which industries they had to
develop knew which components they needed to be able to uh compete in and
and now they're still behind in chips but not very far behind. I mean actually
Jason Hang you know from Nvidia is right about he he's absolutely right that if
you do what you're doing then you're just going to create China's just going to develop a very competitive and large
computer industry which will out compete us and that's what's that's in the process of what's happening and AI um
well China was significantly behind but I don't think it is I think if you look reading the commentators at the moment
in financial times and other places I mean there's a general view that probably China is um you know more or
less on a par in some ways ahead of I mean they got a remember last January a
year ago when deep sea yep yeah open source I mean open source is
belt and road the way the Americans do it no they can't afford
uh they can't afford to buy AI but they can open eye open source well it enables
all sorts of people to use it. Okay. And I want to make a I want to just have a comment and then I'll have a final question to this. Um I mean I
think the comment is that and I want your your reflection response to the comment and then the final question. So I mean I think you see Trump in my view
I mean I think the key is that he's not strategic and I think America if they were really interested in a in ensuring
that China doesn't become a rival to them they should have been much more smart about identifying that in about
about 25 years ago. Yeah. Um but they were they were they were caught up in a bunch of silly wars. Silly wars which are very identitarian
in the Middle East in other parts and their foreign policy. I just think I think they just underestimated China. They were like these which is a racist
view as well. These guys will never it is a racist. Yes. These guys will never actually compete with us. Until they they they they suddenly had
better better goods and everything else. But I think the other thing is that Trump's going about then trying to have
this war on China. But instead of isolating China, he's isolating the US. So he's not he's not trying to build
strong alliances with Europe and other partners to say, "Hey, we're in a problem here. There's this massive
Chinese state civilization that's going to come and, you know, destroy us all." Not that that's true at any stretch of
the imagination, but or even, you know, or that's a threat to our our economic dominance. It's a threat to our cultural
dominance. He's he's isolating the Europeans. He's isolating because he's, you know, he's fighting everyone. Yeah.
Right. which is just it's just it's this it's it's a mixture of stupidity and bravado and it's just it is bound to
fail, right? But the thing is I'm guessing that that instinct will will self-correct at some point if not in
Trump but in the US administration and and and if Europe has some and they will
have they do have a skin in the game then will so do you see some sort of future in before we get to you know the
final question which was how you know how is this going to change the whole world but do you see some for some future in maybe four years or six years
or 10 years where the Europeans and and Americans and others who feel the threat
from China's China's dominance either economically or culturally or any other way um militarily for example um do you
see them working together in a more structive strategic way in some for some future well the west
yes the west uh I think the west is in big trouble I think probably
uh with Trump I mean a lot of what you said Trump I agree um I think that with
Trump um I mean America's definitely it's it's not just Trump Trump's
reflecting a grand sort of opinion in the United States that you know which is
a return to the past really America on its own you know I mean prior to the first world war America wouldn't have
been bound up with all these international organizations and all that kind of thing so yeah but it also just wasn't the same
country that it was I mean it was a rising power etc but it wasn't it just wasn't what it you know rest of the world had colonies and America had
itself you know back America was a um Um it it
was America alone and and this is what you know Trump Trump you know Trump Trump believes this is what Trump
believes he he believes everyone else is inferior uh you know if the Europeans won't do uh our bidding then you know
we'll kick them into touch and so on. I mean um so I think that uh I think I I
think that we we don't know the answer to these questions because a lot in the future but I think that
uh a lot of I think basically the west as we've known it is over and that
well that idea of the Atlantic alliance and
so on That's that that is going to weaken, I think.
So, you don't think it will it will strengthen after like a initial weakening because they'll realize, oh, well, it could do. That is a
possibility. I I think we're in the the land of the unknown here. Um I mean
uh because obviously there's going to be a lot of changes in Europe as well. I mean, we haven't really see Europe has
just been sort of uh doing two things. moving to the right or the rise of the
far right um and on the one hand and on the other hand uh trying to appease
America and uh with Trump and that that that's been its preoccupation
um and then there are now strong voices well we got to stand up to America you know we can't allow Greenland etc and
all that um Stum made a mistake you know Europe made a mistake in not uh uh um uh
uh responding to the tariff threat a year ago in the way that it should have
done that from April 20 25 onwards. So I think that um I I I I
my feeling is that it it will be very difficult to put that to get back together again. Now the then then
there's another aspect to this which when you talk about alliances it's not just America and Europe it's America and
for example South Korea bases Japan bases um Taiwan now I don't I think in
this situation Japan is a a problem
of its own in its own making but South Korea I think isn't going to go with America. I mean it it
it's true. It can pivot. Yes. Yeah. I mean it it's it's going to play it both ways, but it's probably going to
lean more and more towards China. Yeah. Even if even even unintentionally, but it will.
Yeah, definitely. Yeah. Um and um Taiwan
Taiwan's fate
Taiwan is going to become part of China, you know. I think that is absolutely inevitable. Um
do you mean like like in a in a in a more soft way or do you mean in a hard way? I think I think that
China's shown enormous patience. I don't know where there's a quote in Kis call
on China where he quotes Mao uh and Mao is I think Mao said something like
Taiwan it's just an island we can wait 100 years or something like that very long time scale very and I think that
the Chinese can be very patient because because Taiwan is there is I mean there
are signs of a new political movement anyway in Taiwan which is more sympathetic towards China the new leader
of the KMT somewhere which is part of waiting for 100 years that that will happen. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Um um but they'll keep the pressure up as you can see. And if I I I
don't I've never believe I've never really gone with the idea that she will
in 2027 or the is going to invade Taiwan. I don't
I don't think it makes strategic sense for them. I think it makes the more strategic position is to wait. Yeah,
definitely. And now, you know, the world and and China's playing a really good
China's really got it right now. You know, it's it it doesn't react to all this stuff going on. It's just quiet
self asssurance and reassurance that the that she and you know, we're getting on
with the job. We're modernizing China. You know, we're supplying you with electric vehicles. Who we we're the
global leader in in green technology. We're we're about to reduce our CO2
emissions massively over the next 20 years. So I think that you know we are the responsible responsible global
leader. I think that's what the China so I don't think they'd want to been invade
Taiwan at all. Um and I when I'm in I you know I got quite well connected in
China and you know I don't hear them talking about Taiwan in
a threat. So I I think that So I think that that that that the world the world
is um America's losing its bish. I think the global order as we've known it grown
up with it since 1945 is broken and it won't be possible to put it together
again. Um and that's a problem because the Chinese actually are supportive of
the present global order with reforms. That's their position whereas Trump is
seems to be basically against it. So um so I think that uh uh I think the
question will be with will can Europe
um come to terms with its a different relationship with China. I mean the big
problem the Europeans have got is basically arrogance I think towards China. they, you know, they think that
they think that they thought they were superior, that they didn't believe in the rise of China, you know, they
wouldn't be able to compete with the top European firms, blah blah blah. And look what happens. The biggest most important
industry in Europe is the car industry and the Chinese have taken them to clean
the cleaners because they were smug, complacent, thought they could never happen. So they're in, you know,
Mercedes-Benz, Volkvagen, all these firms are in big trouble. Uh uh who would have thought that? Um well, that
is just an example of what of what is happening. So the Europeans, you know,
if you go back to 1978, 1980, the Germans were very far-sighted.
Vfagen was very far-sighted. The the Chinese wanted to western investment,
European investment. So I think Vauvaren built his first plant in China in 2000
uh 1982. Um that's a hell of a long time ago. So
they were the they dominated the roads. I mean I'm interested cars and I was
always frustrated that there were no chi the Chinese models just didn't sell compared with the western models. But
you know so what's happened now is why did the Chinese want European in the
European in the first place? because they wanted the investment. They needed to learn. They needed the technology.
Now what's happened? It's the European firms that need the
technology that need you know the knowhow of the Chinese firm. It's a
complete inversion in the relationship from being inferior. They're on top. Now how is Europe going to come to terms
with all that? Okay. Now, by the way, the other thing is in the longer run about America is
because it this is too long to but at some point there'll be a calculation in
America that getting on with China is better and more profitable than falling
out with him and having these big arguments that at some point America will have to accept a fundamental
fundamentally different relationship with China just like Europe has got to do. I mean I I think I think when they
if that happens and when it happens it's almost by then they will settle for being the not hedgeimon
they'll just realize I mean because usually that's when you settle when you when you can when you have to settle because you don't have the power
anymore. Yes. When you have the power you feel you can do anything. You punch and shout and scream and
kidnap presidents. Um a final question and I mean you you can answer it in stages so it may not be the final
question but just how is I mean I think I do agree with you that I think in the
20 or 30 year trajectory or even even shorter China's relative strength will increase um and the US I mean they do
have a a problem with the with the you know the the remnants of the one child policy where China's population is going
to start declining for a long period and that's definitely going to impact their ability to grow but I mean I think there
will there will still because you know I they they are still going to grow on the whole. I mean I'm not sure what the longer trajectory is because of that
that particular policy but just maybe respond to that but it it's clear that China is you know it's making as you've
said it's making an an alliance infrastructure alliance a trading alliance with the global south who needs
it because the global south is also mistrustful of the west and the only actors that are still dealing with the
west I think in the global south are are countries that or or you know either run by by by people who want a profitable
relationship with the west or almost you know invariably they are they are they are countries in the global south that
have a genuine profitable relationship with the west but a lot of them do it because you know there's a form of coercion that has its history with
corporations that were set up by colonial entities etc etc and I think they they look at China with a bit of
suspicion maybe but increasingly also with a bit of relief there's there's someone else we can go to there's
someone else we can trade with um I know with South Africa for example when when when you know there's as the US are
putting on tariffs and restrictions that may or may not be related to South Africa's genocide case against Israel,
the South African members of government and other say oh it's okay we can go to China now right um so there's this
element of relief how do you see the global south changing due to the you
know the rise of China and the decline of the west I think this is the the embryo of the future the the future is uh at the core
of the future is the relationship between China and the global south um
and It's actually uh it's not a new phenomenon but it's
been a growing phenomenon. Its roots go back to the second world war and
postcond world war period and the uh anti-colonial movement and uh and China
has uh always had um a very positive
uh empathetic attitude towards the developing world. It identifies with the developing world. It doesn't identify
with the west. That doesn't mean it doesn't see anything positive or the importance of getting on with the west,
but it doesn't identify with the west. It identifies with the developing world.
And uh so I think that the the the next period, however long it is, will be um
uh the a process by which a new global order
begins to take shape. And the global order will be structured around China
and the global south. I don't mean by that that the west won't be a part of it. Everyone will be a part of it. A
global order is got to be inclusive. But the the the big players, the architects
of it will be uh China and the global south. Um and a country like India for
example uh is very important to this and the relationship between India and China which hasn't been great uh it's that's a
very important relationship which I hope can become uh uh uh more um more
friendly in the future. Um and I think that you know if you look if
I stand back from this period now of what's happening and think of it historically
Um what is all what what is all the the unpredictability, the uncertainty, the
volatility, um the breakdown of relationships, the breakdown of u of of um in trading
relationships. So what is all that about? Because it is quite extraordinary what's happening and it's been happening very very quickly. What is that about? I
think what we're witnessing is the end of the era of American dominance.
Um I mean maybe even western dominance. Well in America American dominance in
the first instance and with the end of American dominance is the end of western dominance because there ain't no western
dominance without the United States. Uh because Europe is that much weaker than the United States. Now what? So I think
and this period started I think uh in 2008 looking back on it with the
financial crisis that was the moment when the citadels of American financial power were shaken and also the
realization in America and the American elite and and of course the the forces
like Trump, they realized that China was
really a very powerful country already
and ever since then you've got the Trump the rise of Trump you've got bit huge
shift in American attitudes breakdown of uh the western alliance as
we've seen it and so on so there's a fragmentation and sort of disintegration
taking place in the western world meanwhile the developing world is growing much faster than the developed
world and And there's a self-confidence I think growing in the global south about what
the possibilities are and I agree absolutely what you said that China providing them with a possibility with
an alternative with a way of developing which they didn't have uh with the west
because the west had was either colonialist attitude or postcolonialist attitude which was drawn from the the
colonial attitude. So I think that now the only historical period we've ever
had in the modern period like this was equivalent was that between 1931 and
1945 which was the end of Brit British Ageman
and the rise of America. But there was a very unstable period as we all know.
Maybe you could take it make it a bit earlier maybe 1929 when there was when there was great instability when you
know everything was going yeah everything was breaking down and so on. Of course to fascism and then the second
world war and then in 1945 you had the resolution of that by the emergence of the United States as the new hegamman.
So I feel I think I see that as a parallel period uh uh to the the one
we're living in now. The only thing we don't know is you know how long this period is going to last but it's
certainly not near any kind of resolution at the moment. I I think at least 20 years is my guess. Something
like do you think I mean you know that the previous period you spoke about you know it resulted in a massive war the biggest war we've ever known. I mean never mind
the biggest war we've ever known. I don't think we'll have something of that sort necessarily, but I mean do you see a lot of political and military turmoil
in this period? Yeah. How bad? Uh well the political turmo look we've
already political turmoil is happening now and the economic turmoil is happening now. The only thing we don't have uh is
military turmoil. Although we do have, you know, we do have uh a war going, we
we we we've got the Ukraine situation. Um we've got uh Gaza
uh which was, you know, appalling um by the Israelis and then you've got um
uh you know, the Venezuela and uh the threat on the Greenland.
So, and so that military side is accelerating. I mean, Trump posed as a man of peace. I I always thought that
was baloney. Um, that's just a marketing job. Uh, uh, opportunistic marketing job
because I I, you know, he obviously fancies using the military. He likes to use it on anyone except anyone who can
give him a bloody eye, bloody nose. Sorry. So, so, uh, so, um, so I think that, uh,
uh, you know, we we we we've not seen the worst of it. I I think it's going to get worse. I think the situation is
going to get worse. It's going to get more dangerous. I think uh um, for from
a military aspect, I don't re rule out something awful happening. Uh I think
that um I think the main the main deterrent that's a awful happening is um
that China uh can do to the United States much worse than the United States can do to China. That's a deterrent.
Okay, Martin Jax, thank you so much for your time. Thank you.
